Tom Lyon is the Dow Professor of Sustainable Science, Technology and Commerce, and serves as Co-Director of the Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise.

Research and teaching interests include corporate environmental strategy; government regulation of business; industrial organization; and energy and the environment.

Awards and Grants:
Gilbert White Fellowship, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, 2002- 2003. Fulbright Grant, Pisa Chair in the Economics of Innovation, Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy, January-April 1997. John M. Olin Visiting Professor, Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago, 1995-96.

Current/Recent Research:
Environmental Information Disclosure Greenwash Voluntary Environmental Programs Renewable Portfolio Standards

Current/Recent Teaching:
Environmental Governance Competitive Tactics Social Institutions for Energy Production Regulation Non-Market Strategy

Selected Publications:
The Political Economy of Regulation, editor, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007. Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

“Why Rate-of-Return Adders are Unlikely to Increase Transmission Investment,” The Electricity Journal, 2007: 48-55.

“Voluntary Environmental Agreements when Regulatory Capacity is Weak,” (with Allen Blackman and Nicholas Sisto), Comparative Economic Studies, 2006: 682-702.

“Does Dual Sourcing Lower Procurement Costs?,” Journal of Industrial Economics, June 2006, 54: 223-252.

“Regulatory Opportunism and Investment Behavior: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 2005.

“Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy,” (lead article), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2004, 13: 561-598.

“Spatial Proximity and Complementarities in the Trading of Tacit Knowledge,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004, 22: 1115-1135.

“Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-up Problem,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2004, 20: 148-169.

“Self-Regulation, Taxation, and Public Voluntary Environmental Agreements,” Journal of Public Economics, 2003, 87: 1453-1486.

“Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism,” Journal of Law and Economics, 2000, 43: 583-618.

“Quality Leadership when Regulatory Standards are Forthcoming,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 2000, 48: 331-348.